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Abstrak.
Di banyak negara, hubungan antara desentralisasi pemerintah dan tingkat
ekstraksi sewa oleh pihak swasta merupakan elemen penting dalam perdebatan baru
pada desain institusional. Topik korupsi secara aktif, terbuka dan diperdebatkan di
Indonesia oleh Pemerintah, mitra pembangunan, dan kelompok berbasis luas dari para
pemimpin politik dan masyarakat sipil yang terlibat dalam pertemuan dan pertukaran
setiap hari. Dalam perdebatan tentang korupsi banyak perhatian diarahkan untuk peran
gaji sektor publik, terutama di era desentralisasi. Berdasarkan fenomena ini, penulis
ingin menganalisis hubungan antara korupsi dan desentralisasi. Menggunakan OSL
model, kita dapat menemukan hubungan positif yang sangat kuat dan konsisten antara
dua variabel di seluruh sampel dari daerah, sehingga memberikan beberapa dukungan
untuk teori desentralisasi yang menekankan manfaat. Asosiasi ini adalah kuat untuk
mengendalikan berbagai kemungkinan potensial dari upaya menghilangkan sebagian
variabel serta bias endogenitas.
Kata Kunci: Korupsi, Desentralisasi, OSL Model
Abstract.
In many countries, relationship between decentralization of government activities
and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent
debate on institutional design. The topic of corruption was actively, openly and debated
in Indonesia by government, its development partners, and a broadly based group of
political and civil society leaders are engaged in meetings and exchange on a daily
basis. In the ongoing debate on corruption a lot of attention is paid to the role of public
sector salaries, particularly in the decentralization era. Based on this phenomenon, the
authors want to analyze the relationship between corruption and decentralization. Using
OSL model, we can find a very strong and consistent positive association between the
two variables across a sample of region, thereby providing some support for theories of
decentralization that emphasize its benefits. This association is robust to controlling for
a wide range of potential sources of omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity bias.
Keywords: Corruption, Decentralization, OSL Model
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent
of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on
institutional design. In this paper, we systematically examine this issue empirically, by
looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption,
as measured by a number of different indices. Fiscal decentralization involves the
transfer of taxing and spending powers to sub national level of government. Developing
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countries are in general more centralized than most industrialized countries were at a
similar stage of development.
As a consequence of much dissatisfaction with the results of centralized economic
planning, reformers have turned to decentralization to break the grip of central
government and induce broader participation in democratic governance. Thus fiscal
decentralization has become an important theme of governance in many developing
countries over the past two decades. For developing countries on average, the share of
public sector expenditures allocated at the sub national level increased from less than
13% in 1980 to about 20% in the late 1990s. In the same period, there has been a
modest increase in the share of local in total taxes.
Fiscal decentralization is the assignment of expenditure and revenue mobilization
function to sub national levels of government. The term thus encompasses two distinct
public sector functions-spending and taxation-and fiscal decentralization reform can
vary in the degree to which each of the two is shifted from the central to a local
government level. Where local expenditure is higher than local taxes, the difference is
financed by e.g. transfer from the central government, borrowing and/or donor support.
Inter governmental transfer are indeed the dominant source of revenues for local
governments in developing countries, although there are substantial differences between
countries. The advantages to fiscal decentralization are commonly though to be three
fold; a) Preference matching; b) Efficiency through competition and c) Increased
accountability
By being closer to its citizens and hence possibly better informed about local
preferences, local government is in a better position to provide public goods and
services which meet people’s needs. Public services can also be made more efficient
and perhaps innovative when territories compete with each other for custom of mobile
citizen. In addition, by reducing the distance between the government and the governed,
fiscal decentralization is expected to stimulate participation and improve accountability.
The disadvantages decentralization may lead to inefficiency decisions and use of
resources, if there are positive or negative externalities between regions, or if there are
economies of scale or scope in fiscal functions. Shifting more fiscal decisions to local
government, may also increase national inequity, and leave the central government with
fewer policy instruments to correct this. Moreover if the capacity of local institutions is
constrained, fiscal decentralization may transfer tasks to the local level which it is
incapable of addressing properly.
While national efficiency and equity considerations entail questions of what type
of functions to delegate to local levels, the problem of capacity constraint raises
question of whether local institutions are capable of taking on added functions, and
whether and how to improve local capacity to enable them to do so. The answer will
differ from country to country and between local authorities within countries, especially
between rural and urban local governments authorities.
Why is corruption? Defined here as the misuse of public office for private gain-
perceived to be more widespread in some countries than others? Understanding this is
important for several reasons. Corruption has been blamed for failures of certain
“developing countries” to develop, and recent empirical research confirms a link
between higher perceived corruption and lower investment and growth (Mauro, 1995;
World Bank, 1997). Political scandals in countries across the globe have sparked public
outrage against corruption in recent years and in dozens of countries discredited
governments have been forced out of office. At the same time, corruption is viewed as
one the main obstacles that post-communist countries face in attempting to consolidate
democratic institutions and open, market economies (Shleifer, 1997).
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Yet very little is known for sure about what causes corruption to be higher in one
place than another. While theories abound and while numerous case studies have
examined the details of corruption in particular countries or regions, cross national
comparative empirical research is much rarer. Especially the study of causes and
consequences of corruption has a long history in economics, dating back at least to the
seminal contributions to the rent-seeking literature by Bhagwati (1982), Krueger (1974),
Rose-Ackerman (1978), Tullock (1967) and others. However, related empirical work
has been rather limited, partly because the degree of efficiency of government
institutions cannot easily be quantified. Corruption in particular is a difficult
phenomenon to measure, owing to its very nature.
Renewed interest in the topic has recently led a number of researchers to attempt
to quantify the extent to which corruption permeates economic interactions by using
indices sold by private rating agencies. These indices are typically based on the replies
to standardized questioners by consultants located in a variety of countries, and
therefore have the obvious drawback of subjective. Nevertheless, the correlation
between indices produced by different rating agencies is very high, suggesting that there
seems to be certain consensus among observers on the ranking countries according to
their degree of corruption (Mauro, 1995).
The difficulty of measuring levels of relative corruption in different countries has
presented a major obstacle. Recently, however, economists and political scientists have
begun to analyze indexes of “perceived” corruption prepared by business risk analysts
and pooling organizations, based on survey responses of businessmen and local
residents.
The topic of corruption was actively, openly and debated in Indonesia by
government, its development partners, and a broadly based group of political and civil
society leaders are engaged in meetings and exchange on a daily basis. In the ongoing
debate on corruption a lot of attention is paid to the role of public sector salaries
(Megantara, Andie and Noor Fuad, 2003). Corruption commonly entails the providing
of service by a public servant or politician in exchange for bribe. Indeed, some
economist consider corruption to be means of aiding the economy, particularly in the
case of cumbersome regulation, excessive bureaucracy or market restrictions (Bayley
1966, Nye 1967, huntington 1968, and Leff 1964).
Recently, Indonesian  Corruption Watch (ICW) published list of public institution
that involve on corruption case (Media Indonesia, 2006). (Graph 1).
Graph 1. Corruption in public institution
Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2006.
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Notes:
BKPM = Investment Coordinating Board
Setneg = Ministry of the State Secretariat
Peruri = Money Printing Public Company of the Republic of Indonesia
DLLAJR = City Land Transportation Agency
Deplu = Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Depkeu = Ministry of Finance
Depdiknas = Ministry of National Education
Depag = Ministry o Religious Affairs
Dephut = Ministry of Forestry
MA/PT/PN = Supreme Court (MA)/ Provincial High Court (PT)/ District Court (PN)
Kepolisian = Indonesian National Police
KPU/KPUD = General Elections Commission (KPU)/ Regional General Elections Commission (KPUD)
BUMN/BUMD = State-owned enterprises (BUMN)/Reionally-owned Enterprises
DPRD = Legislative Council at the provincial or regional level
Pemda = Regional Government
ICW states that the most corrupted institution is dominated by local public
institution like local government (Pemda), and local legislative (DPRD). The main
corruption modus is mark up budget, and misallocation of budget. The Graph 2 describe
many modus of corruption.
Graph 2. Modus of corruption (%)
Source: Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2006.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Based on this phenomenon, the authors want to analyze the relationship between
corruption and decentralization. Recent theoretical models make opposing predictions
on the relationship between corruption and decentralization: models that emphasize
interjurisdictional competition or direct monitoring of bureaucrats generally favor
decentralization while those that focus on coordination of rent-seeking or bureaucrats.
The type of decentralization, often matters in these models: in particular, whether
revenue generation and expenditure, or just expenditure, is decentralized, will influence
the extent bureaucratic corruption.
It would therefore be useful to analyze the empirical relationship between
corruption and decentralization. Furthermore, based on Fisman. Raymond and Roberta
Gatti Model (2002) and Mauro Model (1995), this paper wants to analyze the
relationship between corruption and decentralization by adding control variables, it is
important to be extremely cautious before interpreting correlations in a causal sense. An
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additional drawback of the indicators of corruption that are currently available is that
they do not distinguish among the various types of corruption, such as, for example high
level versus low level corruption, or well-organized versus poorly-organized corruption,
other classification.
This paper has the main aims. The first one is to present further results on the
effects of corruption on decentralization especially by adding control variables and by
using a pool data set. This article consists of several sections, first section describe
background why corruption become interest topic to analyze. The following section
outlines leading theories of what causes and consequences of corruption. Section 3,
describes the data and presents the statistical. Section 4 discusses the results and various
sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
Definition of corruption
Numerous definitions for the term corruption have been proposed and cited in
academic research and policy-relevant literature on corruption. Perhaps the most widely
cited definitions of corruption in the public sector and the one used in the current study
denotes corruption as:
The abuse of office for private gain
Public office is abused by private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or
exhorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offers bribes to
circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit.
Public office can also abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs,
through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state
revenues (World Bank, 1997:8)
Alternative definitions of corruption include “the degree of misuse of public
power for private benefit”, and “the likeliness to demand illegal payments in high and
low level of government”. However, not all types of corruption involve direct monetary
payments, as a government official may receive more subtle benefits from corrupt
activities, such as political support. Public official may demand bribes to do what they
are supposed to do anyway (i.e. so called “speed” or “grease money”) or accept bribes
to do what they are not supposed to do, such as overlook the underreporting of tax
liabilities (Bardhan, 1997).
Theories of decentralization
A variety of models have been developed to examine the political economy of
decentralization, leading to very different implications for the relationship between
decentralization and corruption. Broadly speaking, these models emphasize several
basic factors: (a) interjurisdictional competition; (b) monitoring and direct
accountability; (c) dispersion of decision-making powers; d) competence and
bureaucratic “quality”.
The first one, initially developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), emphasizes
competition in product markets, political competition reduces the ability of bureaucrats
to extract rents in exchange services. Jin et al (1999) further highlight the fact that
competition among localities will more generally discourage governments from
establishing interventionist and distortion policies that might drive away valuable
factors of production to less interventionist jurisdictions. Interjuridictional competition,
therefore, predicts lower levels of corruption in decentralized economies.
These ideas have attracted considerable attention in the policy world, and Wei
(2000) has even suggested that countries set up corruption-free zones to force other
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localities to improve their own bureaucracies. Persson and Tabellini (2000) consider the
impact of decentralization where bureaucrats are agents trying to minimize effort and
maximize the probability of re-election. Agents in centralized bureaucracy are
responsible for a multitude of tasks that affect many localities; by contrast, under
decentralization, each politician is responsible for a specific task that is particular to a
single jurisdiction.
The intuition is that, under decentralization, politicians are held directly
accountable for their actions. Instead, under centralization, all that matters is aggregate
performance, which attenuates the link between effort and rewards. Thus, under
decentralization, more direct accountability should improve politician’ performance. A
similar line of reasoning underlies many accounts of the success of decentralization in
practice in that it brings decision-making closer to those that are affected. For example,
Wade (1997) suggests that India’s over centralized top-down structure was largely
responsible for corruption in the irrigation bureaucracy. However, even among this class
of models, it is not unambiguously true that decentralization reduces corruption: if
decentralization creates multiple tiers of government, it could weaken accountability,
since voters would have greater difficulty attributing blame for failures and credit for
successes.
The relationship between corruption and decentralization: theory
There has been considerable debate on the merits of government decentralization.
Tiebout (1956) says that decentralization leads to greater variety in the provision of
public goods, which are tailored to better suit local populations. Prud’homme (1995)
and Tanzi (1996) have argued that there exist many imperfections in the local provision
of services that may prevent the realization of benefits from decentralization. For
example, local bureaucrats may be poorly trained and thus inefficient in delivering
public goods and services.
On other side, Besley and Coate (1999) have shown that, with the exception on
heterogeneity of preferences, there is relatively little theoretical decentralization must be
justified by political economy explanations. One such possibility, which has received
much attention, is that accountability and behavior of bureaucrats may differ between
centralized and decentralized system.
Huther and Shah (1998) find a negative correlation between corruption and
decentralization. However, they look only at the unconditional correlation between
fiscal decentralization and corruption. There many factors that would obviously be
highly correlated with both variables: in particular, income is highly correlated with
quality of governance, however measured and is also strongly correlated with
decentralization (it is well known that development is generally accompanied by
decentralization). Hence, problems of omitted variable bias are extreme in such an
analysis.
Treisman (2000) finds that federalist countries have higher rates of corruption.
Treiman’s measure of decentralization is a simple dummy variable, reflecting whether a
country has a federal structure, which may not accurately reflect the true extent of
decentralization of powers and resources in a given country.
The causes of corruption: theory
In original literature on rent seeking, the existence of rents (typically, government
induced ones) constitutes the ultimate source of rent-seeking behavior. Building upon
these theoretical; contributions, recent empirical studies analyze the possible causes of
corruption by regressing indices of corruption on potential explanatory variables.
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A number of possible causes of corruption are related to the extent of government
intervention in the economy, and-more generally-to variables (such as the level of
import tariffs or civil services wages) that are determined by government policy. When
pervasive regulations exist and government officials have an excessive degree of
discretion in applying them, private parties may be willing to pay bribes to government
officials in order to obtain any rents that the regulations may generate. Identification of
such policy-induced sources of corruption is obviously helpful in bringing it under
control. The following are some of the sources of corruption that have been identified in
the literature.
a. The original rent seeking literature emphasizes trade restrictions as the prime
example of government-induced sources of rents (Krueger, 1974). For example, in
the presence of quantitative restrictions on imports of certain good, the necessary
import licenses are very valuable and importers may be willing to bribe the relevant
official in order to obtain them, More generally, protection of home industries from
international competition generates rents that local entrepreneurs may be willing to
pay for, in the form of bribes. Ades and Di tella (1994) find that the sum of imports
and exports as a share of GDP) is significantly associated with lower corruption.
b. Government subsidies (including tax expenditures) can constitute sources of rents, as
argued by Clements, Hugounenq and Schwartz (1995). Ades and Di Tella (1995)
explain corruption as a function of industrial policy, showing that subsidies to
manufacturing as a proportion of GDP are related to corruption indices.
c. Price controls are also a potential sources of rents, and of the ensuing rent-seeking
behavior. For example, entrepreneurs may be willing to bribe government officials to
maintain the provision of inputs at below market prices.
d. Similarly, multiple exchange rate practices and foreign exchange allocation schemes
lead to rents. For example supposing that, in a given country, state owned
commercial banks conduct rationing of foreign exchange by allocating it according
to the priorities established by each bank manager, then entrepreneurs may be willing
to pay bribes in order to obtain the necessary foreign exchange to purchase their
imported inputs.
e. Low wages in the civil service relative to private sector wages or per capita GDP are
also a potential source of (low level) corruption, following efficiency-wage
mechanisms (Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995 and Hague and Sahay, 1996). When
civil service pay is too low, civil servants may be obliged to use their positions to
collect bribes as a way of making ends meet, and in any case their expected cost of
being caught and fired is correspondingly low. It might be useful to take such
considerations into account when face with difficult tradeoffs on whether an
excessive civil service wage bill should be lowered through cutting salaries or
through reducing the number of staff..
At the same time, there are a number of other sources of rents that are not due to
government policy. In their presence, policy makers need to be alert to the fact that rent-
seeking behavior may be more likely to arise. Furthermore, attempts to evaluate the
effects of certain aspects of government policy on corruption need to take these other
factors into account, The following are some of these additional causes of corruption.
a. Natural resource endowments constitute a textbook example of sources of rents,
since they can typically be sold at a price that far exceeds their cost of extraction.
Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that resource-rich economies may be ore likely to be
subject to extreme rent-seeking behavior than resource-poor economies are..
b. Finally, sociology factors may contribute to creating an environment in which the
availability of rents is more likely to result in rent seeking behavior. Shleifer and
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Vishny (1993) suggest that countries where the population consists of several
different ethnic groups are more likely to be characterized by a less organized and
therefore mode deleterious type of corruption. This hypothesis is used in Mauro
(1995), where it is found that an index of ethnolinguitc fractionalization is correlated
with corruption. Tanzi (1994) argues that public officials are mode likely to do
favors to their relatives in societies where family ties are strong.
The consequences of corruption: theory
Corruption has a number of adverse consequences that economists and policy
makers are concerned about. In particular, recent empirical evidence seems to suggest
that corruption lowers economic growth. There is a wide range of channels through
which this may happen.
a. In the presence of corruption, entrepreneurs are aware that a portion of the proceeds
from their investments may be claimed by corrupt officials. Payment of bribes is
often required up front if the necessary permits are to be issued. Therefore,
corruption may be interpreted to act as a tax-though of a particularly pernicious
nature, given the need for secrecy and the uncertainty that comes with it-which
correspondingly reduces incentives to invest. Mauro (1995) provide tentative
empirical evidence that corruption lowers investment and economic growth. The
magnitudes of these effects are considerable: a one standard-deviation improvement
in corruption indices drawn from Business International (BI) causes investment to
rise by 5 percent of GDP and the annual per capita GDP growth rate to rise by half a
percentage point. The evidence seems to suggest that a large portion the effects on
economic growth takes place through the effects on investment. Using indices from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Keefer and Knack (1994) obtain
broadly similar results and, in their estimates, institutional variables have a
significant direct effect on growth in addition to the direct effect through investment.
b. Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1991) argue that in situations where rent-seeking
provides more lucrative opportunities that productive work does, the allocation of
talent will be worse: the mode talented and highly educated individuals will be more
likely to engage in rent-seeking than in productive work, with adverse consequences
on their country’s growth rate.
c. The possibility that corruption might be reduce the effectives of aid flows, through
the diversion of funds, is of particular relevance to developing countries. The vast
literature on aid flows has addressed the question of whether the fungibility of aid
resources may imply that aid flows ultimately finance unproductive public
expenditures. Perhaps as a result of this ongoing debate, many donor countries have
focused increasingly on issues of good governance, and in some cases where
governance is judged to be very poor, some donors have scaled back their
assistance..
d. Corruption may also bring about loss of tax revenue when it takes the form of tax
evasion or the improper use of discretionary tax exemptions. Strictly speaking, these
phenomena fall under the definition of corruption only when there is a counterpart
payment to the tax official responsible.
e. By affecting tax collection or the level of public expenditure, corruption may lead to
adverse budgetary consequences. Alternatively, in the case where it takes the form of
the improper use of directed lending at below market interest rates by public sector
financial institution, corruption may result in an undesirable monetary stance.
f. The allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt system may lead to
lower quality of public infrastructure and services. For example, corrupt bureaucrats
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could allow the use of cheap materials in construction of buildings or bridges that
would subsequently collapse.
g. Finally, corruption may affect the composition of government expenditure, a
possibility that the empirical section of this paper focuses on. Corrupt government
official may be more likely to choose to undertake types of government expenditure
that allow them to collect bribes and to maintain them secret, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) suggest that large projects on specialized items-whose exact value is difficult
to monitor lead to more lucrative opportunities for corruption. More generally,
opportunities for levying bribes may be expected to be more abundant on tems
produced by firms operating in oligopolistic markets, where rents are available. A
priori, one might expect that it is easier to collect substantial bribes on large
infrastructure projects or high-technology defense equipment than on textbooks and
teachers salaries. For example, Hines (1995) argues that international trade in
military aircraft is particularly susceptible to corruption. In other areas such as
health, the picture is less clear cut: opportunities to collect bribes may be abundant in
the case of hospital buildings and state of the art medical equipment, but may be
more limited in the case of doctors and nurses salaries. Previous empirical work o the
potential links between corruption and the composition of government expenditure
composition by using a data set in U.S. cities. He finds that the increased the share of
total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment, which in turn
increased the growth in city manufacturing employment..
HYPOTHESES
Based on phenomenon and theoretical background, we derive the following
hypotheses:
H1 : corruption will be lower decentralization (negative correlation)
H2 : corruption will be lower education (negative correlation)
H3 : corruption will be lower population (positive correlation)
H4 : corruption will be lower GDP (negative correlation)
H5 : corruption will be higher tax revenue (negative correlation)
DATA DESCRIPTION
The data for our analyzing are pool data set in Indonesia (2001-2002). We could
not make larger periods for our research because data of corruption is only available by
aggregate data since 2003. Unfortunately, we need data of corruption by province in
Indonesia for our analyzing.
As our principal measure of corruption (CORRUPT), we use the numerous of
canceled local regulation. This has not been most commonly used in previous work in
the economies literatures, because limited data corruption by province in Indonesia. We
make this proxy based on Megantara Model (2003), that policy consistency and policy
coordinating are the most indicating for the seriousness of corruption. Corruption was
affected by rule credibility, policy credibility, and resource adequacy and predictability.
The empirical result of  Megantara Model means that when rule credibility, policy
credibility as well as resource adequacy and predictability are good the less corrupt in
the public official. This data is drawn from Ministry of Finance in Indonesia for 2001-
2002.
We measure decentralization (DECENTR) as the sub national share of total
government spending. The numerator is the total expenditure of sub national (local)
gorvenments, while the denominator is total spending (state) government. The
underlying data are drawn from the Ministry of Finance for the years 2001-2002. The
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share of local spending (revenues) over total spending (revenues) has been widely used
as a proxy for the extent of decentralization (Pryor, 1968; Oates, 1972; Panizza, 1999).
Oates suggest that, although imperfect DECENTR should be a good measure of fiscal
decentralization since the extent of public authority’s activities in taxation and in the
expenditure of public funds is surely component of fundamental importance in
determining its influence on the allocation resources (Oates, 1972:197).
In addition to controlling for the level of economic development, we include in
the regression an education (ENROLL) as suggested by Mauro (1997). The other
control variable are GDP (GDP), and population (POP) as suggested by Mauro (1997),
Fisman and Gatti (2002), Tax revenue suggested by Martinez (2004).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our basic specification is
CORRUPTi =  + ³ DECENTR i + 2 ENROLL i + 3 LogPOP i + 4 Log GDP i + 5
Log TAX i + i
The following table reports coefficients from OLS estimation on data from a cross
section 90 region. Significance of the estimates is based on White-corrected standard
errors.
Table 1. OLS cross-national study. dependent variable: corruption
Dependent Variable: LOG(CORRUPT?)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 2001 2002
Included observations: 2
Number of cross-sections used: 73
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 78
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.342951 0.264145 -5.084138 0.0000
LOG(DECETR?) 0.204286 0.020447 9.991109 0.0000
LOG(ENROLL?) 0.216173 0.052372 4.127685 0.0001
LOG(POP?) -0.033406 0.025851 -1.292220 0.2004
LOG(GDP?) 0.027495 0.017070 1.610768 0.1116
LOG(TAX?) -0.215587 0.012011 -17.94934 0.0000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.785007 Mean dependent var 0.574580
Adjusted R-squared 0.770076 S.D. dependent var 1.033621
S.E. of regression 0.495625 Sum squared resid 17.68637
F-statistic 52.57878 Durbin-Watson stat 3.018583
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.197090 Mean dependent var 0.408125
Adjusted R-squared 0.141332 S.D. dependent var 0.559677
S.E. of regression 0.518621 Sum squared resid 19.36570
Durbin-Watson stat 5.950248
Our measure of decentralization enters the regression with a positive and
strongly significant sign, indicating that region with more decentralized expenditure
have higher corruption. The other independent variabel such a education (ENROLL)
217
Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 4. No. 4, April – June  2017   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online)
also indicating a positive and strongly significant sign, indicating that region with
higher education level tend to corrupt, so do the tax variable that indicating significant
but have negative sign. It means that region with the higher tax tend to less corrupt.
Two variabel independent, population and GDP indicating strongly sign but they are not
significant related to the region corrupt.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have made an initial assessment of the realtionship between
decentralization and corruption. We find a very strong and consistent positive
association between the two variables across a semple of region, thereby providing
some support for theories of decentralization that emphasize its benefits. This
association is robust to controlling for a wide range of potensial sourcesof ommited
variable bias as well as endogeneity bias.
Although data availability limits the conclusiveness of our result, the evidence in
the paper raises a number of interesting issues for further investigation, including
wheter particular types of decentralization are more effective in combating corruption,
and wheter there are specific government services where decentralized provision has a
particularly strong impact on rent-extraction.
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